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ATTACHING CREDITOR AS GARNISHEE
The problem of the right of a plaintiff in an attachment to
garnishee himself was presented to the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals for the first time in the recent case of Emery
v. 0. D. Beck & Co. et at." In this case, P had purchased a bus
from D, for which a part of the purchase price remained unpaid.
P institutes this action for damages for breach of warranty of
quality, and sued out a writ of attachment against D, as a non-
resident, and designated himself as being one indebted to D. It
was held that the court acquired no jurisdiction by virtue of the
garnishment. The West Virginia statute provides that "The
plaintiff in an attachment may. . . designate any person as being
indebted or liable to, or having in his possession, the effects of
the defendant . . ."2 Without a doubt, the literal language of
the statute is broad enough to include the plaintiff in an attach-
ment. proceeding as a possible garnishee, but the court, on the
basis of public policy, limited this section by construing into the
statute the word "other", as though it read "... designate any
other person..."-
Among the foreign jurisdictions today, there is an almost
even split of authority on the validity of this procedure.4  Two
states have, by statute expressly provided that the plaintiff and
the garnishee may be one and the same person.5 Several other
states have reached the same result under a geDeral statute, such
as the one in the instant case. Some of these have reached the
result by reasoning that the statute apparently permits the plain-
tiff to garnishee himself, and they see no sound reason of public
policy which would justify them in denying to the attaching cred-
itor a right which could be enforced by every other creditor, namely
the right to garnishee the debt owing to or property of" the
122 S. E. (2d) 458 (IV. Va. 1942).
W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 38, art, 7, § 15. Italics supplied.
3 ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 7, § 995; ARY, CODE (Pope, 1927) § 540; FLA.
Co p. GE . LAws (1927) § 5284; REv. STATS. (1941) c. 11, § 21; LA.
CODE OF PRACTICE (Bobbs-Merrill, 1942) § 242; TEN-N. CODE (Michie, 1938)
§ 9428.
4 "The jurisdictions on the respective sides are almost exactly equal, with
a slightly larger number of cases favoring the right." Note (1924) 31 A.
L. R. 711, 712. Accord: 4 A.. Jun. Attachment & Garnishment § 138. The
seeming weight of authority denies the right. 28 C. J. 50.
) ARz. CODE (Bobbs-Merrill, 1940) c. 25, § 201; MD. CODE (Flack, 1939)
art. 9, § 10.
O R should make no difference as a matter of theory whether the plaintiff
is indebted to the defendant or has property of the defendant in his hands.
See in accord, Lyman & Co. v. Wood, 42 Vt. 113, 114 (1869); United States
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defendant.7  As one court stated it, "The law is remedial, and
the words of it general, extending the remedy to all creditors,
without distinction; and it would seem strange, that the only
person who cannot obtain justice, against a nonresident, should
be the one who has in his hand, the funds out of which that
satisfaction may be had.' 'S
About an equal number of states deny the right of the plain-
tiff to garnishee himself. One decision was based on the wording
of the statute to the effect that the plaintiff may garnishee "any
other persons"," other cases turned on an expression in the stat-
ute that the plaintiff and the garnishee are to be considered as
adverse parties,10 and the common law principle that the same
party can not occupy adverse positions in the same suit. Other
courts have implied from general terms of the garnishment stat-
ute (e. g., the common provisions for summons, requiring the
garnishee to answer, contempt proceedings or a capias should he
fail to answer, and the rendition of judgment and issuance of
execution against him) that the plaintiff and garnishee occupy
adverse positions and therefore can not be the same person." A
few cases say that the garnishee represents the defendant in the
suit, and therefore should not have an adverse interest. 12 Other
cases state that the garnishee is a mere stakeholder, impartial as
between the other parties, and therefore the plaintiff should not
be the garnishee.13 The court, in the instant case, remarks that
an unhealthy situation would arise if a party to the litigation
F. & G. Co. v. Wrenn, 67 App. D. C. 94, 89 F. (2d) 838, 840 (1937); Note
(1924) 31 A. L. R. 711, 712. But see Beach v. Fairbanks, 52 Conn. 167, 172
(1884).
7 Graiglile v. Notnagle, Pet. C. C. 245, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5679 (1816);
Norton v. Norton, 43 Ohio St. 509, 525 (1885); Moyer v. Lobengeir, 4 Watts
390 (Pa. 1835); Lyman & Co. v. Wood, 42 Vt. 113, 114 (1869).
8 Graighle v. Notnagle, Pet. C. C. 245, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5679 (1816).
9 Rice v. Sharpleigh Hdwe. Co., 85 Fed. 559 (W. D. Tenn. 1898) (under
a Tennessee statute). See note 3, .sura.
30 First National Bank of Fort Scott, Kansas v. Elliott, 62 Kan. 764, 64
Pae. 623 (1901); First International Bank of Minot v. Brehmer, 56 N. D.
81, 215 N. W. 918, 61 A. L. R. 1454 (1927).
13 Belknap v. Gibbens, 54 Mass. 471 (1847); Knight v. Clyde, 12 R. 1.
119 (1878) ; Gerber v. Ogle Coal Co., 195 Wis. 578, 218 N. W. 361, 57 A. L. R.
838 (1928). But see, in answer to this argument, Graighle v. Notnagle, Pet.
C. C. 245Y 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5679 (1816).
12 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Crews, 51 Okla. 144, 151 Pac. 879 (1915);
Knight v. Clyde, 12 R. 1. 119 (1878); 28 C. J. 399.
13 Nevian v. Prochinger, 23 Ind. App. 695, 700, 55 N. E. 1033 (1900);
Belknap v. Gibbens, 54 Mass. 471 (1847) ; Wood v. Bangs, 199 Minn. 208, 271
N. w. 447 (1937).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [1943], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol49/iss2/10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
could by his own action, place himself in a position in which he
is supposed to remain neutral. 4
If the judgment in the attachment suit is to be res adjudicata,1
there is a serious objection to the entire procedure of attachment
and garnishment as a basis of jurisdiction, namely that the non-
resident may have a valid claim extinguished without getting
actual notice of the proceeding or having a chance to defend. In
spite of this, there is provision for foreign attachment and garnish-
ment in every state, and the question is reduced to whether it is
any more iniquitous or objectionable for the plaintiff to garnishee
himself than it is to garnishee a stranger. Many cases suppose
that the garnishee will either defend the foreign attachment pro-
ceeding for the defendant or will give him notice of the garnish-
ment.16 No doubt, in many cases, this will be the result when
the garnishee is a stranger, but the statute in West Virginia is
so drafted that the garnishee is relieved of all liability to either
the plaintiff or the defendant upon payment of the debt or deliv-
ery of the property under order of the court in which the attach-
ment is brought. The effect of this statute is to make the garnishee a
helpless and impotent party to the suit.
14 22 S. E. (2d) 458, 461 (W. Va. 1942).
15 In Graighe v. Notnagle, Pet. C. C. 245, 10 Fed Cas. No. 5679, at page
951 (1916), the court said the defendant in an attachment proceeding could
sue the plaintiff in a separate action, and when the judgment in the attach-
ment proceeding be set up as a plea, deny the existence of the debt upon
which the attachment was brought. Similar result in Moyer v. Lobengeir, 4
Watts 390 (Pa. 1935). The same result was reached under an attachment
order the custom of London (the historical ancestor of our modern attachment
statutes) in Paramore v. Pain, Ore. Eliz. pt. 2, 598, 78 Eng. Rep. 841 (1597),
and Coke v. Brainforth, Cro. Eliz. pt. 2, 830, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 1057 (1601).
See also the dissenting opinion of Jos. Joseph & Bros. Co. v. Hoffman &
MeNeill, 173 Ala. 568, 578, 56 So. 216, 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 924 (1911), in which
the dissenting judges refused to consider a judgment in a foreign attachment
suit in which the plaintiff was garnishee as binding on the defendant in the
attachment, even though such a judgment was valid under the law of the state
rendering it.
'a In the leading case of Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625, 49
L. Ed. 1023 (1905) the court held it was the duty of the garnishee to notify
his creditor (the defendant in the attachment) of the suit; if he failed to give
such notice, the payment by the garnishee to the plaintiff in the attachment
would not be conclusive when the garnishee is sued by his creditor. Accord:
Morgan v. Neville, 74 Pa. St. 52 (1873); Stewart v. Northern Assurance
Co., 45 W. Va. 734, 32 S. E. 218, 44 L. R. A. 101 (1898); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICTS (1934) § 108, comment c. The West Virginia garnishment
statute. W. VA. Rv. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 38, art. 7, § § 15 et seq., has no
requirement that the garnishee give notice to the principal defendant. Quaere as
to the conclusiveness of such a judgment when pleaded in a sister state if the
principal defendant did not know of the suit. See 5 Air. JuR, Attachment
& Garnishment § 80-; 28 C. J. 399.
3
H.: Attaching Creditor as Garnishee
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1943
STUDENT NOTES
At first blush, it does seem a violation of all concept of due
process to allow a person to go into court, garnishee himself, have
service by publication, and then litigate the matter with himself,
and thereby extinguish an obligation owed by him to a party who
was never before the court and likely never knew of the proceed-
ings. But what additional safeguard is there when the garnishee
is a stranger instead of the plaintiff? In West Virginia, the
garnishee has no duty to notify the defendant or to defend the
suit, or even any right to defend the suit other than is given to
any other interested party. Whether the garnishee be the plain-
tiff or a stranger, the proceeding is quasi in rem and essentially
one-sided.
The language of this decision is broad enough to cover two
fundamentally different situations, first, where the garnishment
is the sole basis for the jurisdiction of the court, the so-called
foreign attachment suit (the instant case) and seeond, where the
court has jurisdiction of the defendant by personal service or
general appearance, and the garnishment is merely ancillary to
the main suit, a situation apparently not considered by the court
in delivering its opinion.1 7 However, the syllabus clearly limits
the holding of the case to the first situation, where the garnish-
ment is the sole basis for the jurisdiction of the court. This raises
the old question, "Is the Syllabus the Law?." 8
While the public policy of this state has been declared to
prohibit a plaintiff in a foreign attachment suit from naming
himself as garnishee, it is difficult to see what harm could result
from such procedure when the court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. When, under the West Virginia garnishment law,
the garnishee can neither hinder nor aid either party, is there
any reason in requiring the garnishee to be neutral, a mere stake-
holder? When the statute does not expressly forbid, there would
seem no reason to deny to the plaintiff the right to garnishee
himself, at least where the court has independent jurisdiction.
The court, in the instant case, in which the sole basis for jur-
isdiction was the garnishment, has declared that the public policy
of this state forbids the plaintiff from garnisheeing himself. Wheth-
17In no case which came to the attention of the writer did tho court
make any clear distinction between these two sitnations.
18 From the language of the opinion, it is apparent that tho court was
thinking of the case in which the garnishment was the sole basis of juris-
diction, but there are many statements in the opinion which are not limited
to such a case, and would deny to the plaintiff the right to garnishee him-
self even where the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
4
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er the court will, when faced with the problem of whether
the plaintiff can garnishee himself as to a debt owing to or
property of a defendant in a situation in which the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, literally follow the lan-
guage of the decision and hold that this can not be done, or whether
it will distinguish that case and limit the holding of the instant
case to the scope of the syllabus, only time can tell.19
D. C. H.
"MINABLE" AND "MERCHANTABLE" COAL
The recent case of Tressler Coal Mining Co. v. Klefeld,1 has
revived a question to which, although potentially present in many
coal leases relatively little judicial attention has been directed.
By way of dicta the court discussed the meanings of the terms
"minable" and "merchantable" coal and cited the few available
authorities but undertook no discussion of the subject. Briefly,
the court said that "minable and merchantable coal is coal so
situate that it may be profitably mined and of such quality as to be
salable. "
Is there any difference between the terms minable and mer-
chantable, and, if so, what is it? The fact that each term, on
the surface at least, lies within the connotation of the other does
not alleviate the necessity of independent consideration of each
within its own sphere. In Atwater v. Fall River Pocahontas
Collicries Co.,; the court rejected as "narrow and arbitrary" the
proposition that minable. coal is any coal that can be mined, regard-
less of costs, and adopted the view of the Kentucky court which
declared ruinable coal to be that which "could be profitably mined
by judicious methods". 3  The adoption was qualified, however, by
assertion Ihat "the words must be defined in view of the wording
of the leases." In Ellis v. Cricket Coal Co.,' the Iowa court
presents a more comprehensive analysis of the terms in question:
'9 See Hardman, "The Law" - In West Virginia (1941) 47 W. VA. L. Q.
23; "The Syllabu's Is the Law", id. at page 141; "The Syllabus Is the Law'"-
Another Word, id. at page 209; "The Syllabus Is the Law" - Another Word
by Fox, J. (1942) 48 W. VA. L. Q. 55.
20 See, in addition to the cases herein cited, Notes (1924) 31 A. L. R.
711 and (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1458.
124 S. E. (2d) 98 (W. Va. 1943).
2 119 W. Va. 549, 195 S. E. 99 (1937).
3 Aixier Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal Co., 194 Ky. 14, 238 S. W. 189 (1922).
4 166 Iowa 656, 661, 148 N. W. 887 (1914).
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